From Income to Consumption Tax:
· Some International Implications

REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH*

The international tax regime is based on a delicate consensus among
nations, which has developed gradually since the 1920s. This regime
has evolved, since the end of World War II, into an elaborate system of
widely accepted compromises embodied in tax treaties. The system's
main purpose is to prevent double taxation of the same item of income
of the same taxpayer by two jurisdictions. Such double taxation can
arise, for example, when a taxpayer who is a resident of country A
derives some income from a source in country B, and countries A and
B both assert jurisdiction to tax that income.
To prevent such double taxation, a compromise has been reached
between source and residence jurisdictions: The right to tax active
business income is granted mostly to the source country, while the right
to tax passive (non-business) income is granted mostly to the residence
country. 1 The residence country bears the responsibility of avoiding
double taxation of active income by either crediting the source country
tax against its own tax liability, or by exempting foreign source active
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Andrews, David Bradford, Michael Graetz, Jim Hines, Howell Jackson, Louis Kaplow,
Diane Ring, Hal Scott, Steve Shay, David Tillinghast, and Al Warren, as well as
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business income altogether. On the other hand, the source country has
the responsibility to avoid double taxation of passive income by reducing
its taxation of such income when it is taxed in the residence country.
The current consensus is far from perfect, and in particular, faces two
major problems relating to the two main types of income (active
business income and passive income). The main problem regarding
active business income, which is taxed primarily by the source country,
is to determine the source of that income; if two (or more) countries
claim the income derives from sources within them, the tax treaty
network will not address the ensuing double (or triple, etc.) taxation.
The main problem regarding passive income, which is taxed primarily
by the taxpayer's country of residence, is enforcing the tax, especially
when the residence jurisdiction does not have adequate resources to
collect taxes from its residents. In recent years, this problem has been
exacerbated because several significant taxing jurisdictions (including the
U.S.) have entered into a competition to attract foreign investment and
have, therefore, abolished their withholding taxes on certain types of
passive income (primarily interest).
Notwithstanding these problems, the existence of the consensus
described above is remarkable given the sensitivity of the issue involved;
after all, the ability to collect taxes is an essential attribute of sovereignty
and giving up any tax revenue for a theoretical ideal of avoiding double
taxation is hard for any politician to propose (as Senator Long has
observed, taxing foreigners has been a perennially popular idea).2
The consensus relies on the premise that participants share a common
set of tax bases, including, in particular, the personal and corporate
income taxes, which are the main focus of tax treaties. This premise,
however, may no longer be valid. Specifically, there are now three
major proposals under serious consideration in the United States which
would abolish the U.S. corporate and personal income taxes and
implement in their place a type of consumption tax. The main purpose
of this Article is to consider some possible implications for the
international tax regime of such a development. 3

2. "Don't tax you, don't tax me, tax that fellow behind the tree." Jeffrey L.
Yablon, As Certain as Death - Quotations About Taxes, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 225-112
(Nov. 17, 1994), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File (statement of Senator
Russell B. Long (D. La.)). See also Report on Double Taxation, League of Nations Doc.
E.F.S.73 F.19 at 40 (1923) ("A survey of the whole field of recent taxation shows how
completely Governments are dominated by the desire to tax the foreigner.").
3. For other discussions of this issue see Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, The
International Implications of Consumption Tax Proposals, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 619 (1995);
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Comment on Grubert and Newlon, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 259 ( 1996);
Harry Grabert & T. Scott Newlon, Reply to Avi-Yonah, 49 NAT'L TAX J. 267 (1996)
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The Article is divided into four parts. Part I briefly describes the three
main proposals to replace the corporate and personal income tax with a
type of consumption tax: the national sales tax (NST), the fl.at tax, and
the unlimited savings allowance (USA) tax, with emphasis on their
international aspects. Under all three proposals the effective tax rate on
new investment in the United States will be zero. Part I suggests that,
solely from an international tax perspective, a destination-based tax like
the USA tax or the NST is superior to an origin-based tax like the fl.at
tax, primarily because a destination-based tax addresses the transfer
pricing problem, which is a major challenge to the current system.
Part II describes the potential international implications of the
three consumption tax proposals. It concludes that, under all three
proposals, direct and portfolio investors in both the U.S. and foreign
countries will have an incentive to shift their investment activities into
the United States. This shift will exacerbate the two major problems
facing the current regime. First, multinationals will have an incentive
to shift their income into the U.S., which will make it more difficult to
reach a consensus on the source of active business income. Second,
passive investors will be able to derive tax free income from the U.S.,
which will make it more difficult for their residence jurisdictions to tax
that income, especially if the United States ceases to cooperate in
information exchange programs.
The more difficult task is to try to predict the reaction of other
countries to these likely developments. Part II tentatively suggests that
two types of possible reactions exist. Countries that have relatively little
bargaining power and that depend on foreign investment (which may not
be forthcoming if they maintain higher effective tax rates than the U.S.)
may follow the U.S. lead and abolish their income taxes, either replacing
them with an increase in their existing consumption taxes or cutting
government spending. On the other hand, countries that can rely on
some level of inbound investment even while maintaining a higher

[hereinafter Grubert & Newlon, Reply]; James R. Hines, Fundamental Tax Reform in an
International Setting, Paper presented at the Brookings Institute, February 15, 1996 (on
file with author); Charles E. McLure Jr. & George R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach to
the Direct Taxation of Consumption, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 70 (Michael J.
Boskin ed. 1996); and Stephen E. Shay, Memorandum to ABA Tax Section Tax Systems
Task Force On Selected International Tax Issues Raised by the Domenici-Nunn USA Tax
Act of 1995 (S. 722) and the Armey-Shelby Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act (H.R.
2060, S. 1050) (October 4, 1995).
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effective tax rate (i.e., our major trading partners) may react to the
abolition of the U.S. income tax base by attempting to capture the
revenues foregone by the U.S. This could in tum lead to a "tax war" as
the international tax regime is replaced by increased competition among
tax jurisdictions for those tax revenues.
Part III discusses the possible impact of tax reform on the U.S. tax
treaty network and concludes that our treaty partners would be entitled
to terminate their treaties with the U.S. if it abolished the income tax.
Also, some of our major treaty partners may not be interested in
maintaining their treaties with the U.S. if the U.S. income tax is replaced
by a consumption tax. The reasons for this possible outcome are (a)
there would be no U.S. source-based taxation of active business income,
so that treaties would not be needed to prevent double taxation; (b)
either there would be no U.S. taxation of passive investment (under two
of the three consumption tax proposals) or other countries may not want
the U.S. to reduce its withholding taxes on such investment given the
incentive for their residents to invest in the U.S.; and (c) other countries
may wish to be able to discriminate against U.S. investors in an attempt
to capture the tax base foregone by the United States.
Finally, Part IV addresses the question whether the effect of the
consumption tax proposals on the international tax regime will .be
positive or negative. The answer to this question depends to a large
extent on the answer to the question posed in Part II, namely how other
countries would react to such a move by the U.S. If most countries
were to shift to a consumption tax base, there may be relatively few
negative effects from abandoning the current international tax regime.
If, on the other hand, many significant countries attempted to preserve
an income tax base, the most likely result would be intensified tax
competition and reduced cooperation, and it may not be possible to
maintain the delicate balance underlying the regime. The outcome in
that case may be increased double taxation as well as increased
opportunities for avoiding all taxation and more tax-induced distortions
in global investment :flows. In that case, the question will be what steps
the U.S. can take to mitigate those negative effects.
I.

THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE THREE REFORM
PROPOSALS

As discussed elsewhere in this issue, there are three major proposals
currently on the table to achieve fundamental tax reform, by replacing
the personal and corporate income taxes with some type of consumption
tax. These are, in increasing order of complexity, the proposal .to
abolish the income tax and replace it with the NST, espoused by (among
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others) Chairman Archer and former presidential candidate Senator
Lugar; the flat tax, proposed by (among others) Representative Armey
and former Presidential candidate Steve Forbes; and the USA tax
proposal for a progressive consumption tax, sponsored by (among others)
Senators Nunn and Domenici.4 The rationale for these proposals has
been examined extensively elsewhere and is the topic of other Articles
in this issue. 5 Therefore, it will not be elaborated upon here.

A.

A Brief Description of the International Aspects of the Three
Proposals
1.

The National Sales Tax

The NST proposal is by far the simplest, as well as the most
straightforward, of the three proposals mentioned above. 6 Rep. Archer
and Sen. Lugar would abolish both the corporate and individual income
taxes and replace them with a national retail sales tax (in addition to the
sales taxes levied by most of the states). Since the sales tax would, by

4. For the NST, see National Retail Sales Tax Act of 1996, H.R. 3039, 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), introduced by Representative Schaefer and others on March 6,
1996. For the Armey-Shelby flat tax proposal, see Freedom and Fairness Restoration
Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). S. 1050, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995) introduced by House Majority Leader Richard Armey and Senator Richard Shelby
on July 19, 1995. For the Nunn-Domenici USA tax proposal see S. 722, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995), introduced by Senators Nunn, Domenici, and Kerrey on April 25, 1995,
and the detailed explanation found in Paul H. O'Neill & Robert A. Lutz, Unlimited
Savings Allowance (USA) Tax System: Description and Explanation of the Unlimited
Savings Allowance Income Tax System, 66 TAX NOTES 1482 (Special Supplement, March
10, 1995) [hereinafter O'Neill & Lutz, Description].
5. See Alvin C. Warren Jr., The Proposal/or an 'Unlimited Savings Allowance,'
68 TAX NOTES 1103 (1995); Louis Kaplow, Recovery of Pre-Enactment Basis under a
Consumption Tax: The USA Tax System, 68 TAX NOTES 1109 (1995); Alan L. Feld,
Nunn-Domenici and Nonprofits, 68 TAX NOTES 1119 (1995); Bernard Wolfman,
Corporate Tax Issues Under the Nunn-Domenici Consumption Tax, 68 TAX NOTES 1121
(1995); Bruce Bartlett, Replacing Federal Taxes with a Sales Tax, 68 TAX NOTES 997
(1995); Peter Merrill et al., Corporate Tax Liability Under the USA and Flat Taxes, 68
TAX NOTES 741 (1995); Rachelle B. Bernstein et al., Tax Reform 1995: Looking at Two
Options, 68 TAX NOTES 327 (1995). For a general description of these proposals see
Joint Committee on Taxation, Report on Impact on International Competitiveness of
Replacing the Federal Income Tax (JCS-5-96) (July 17, 1996), reprinted in 96 TAX
NOTES TODAY 141-7 (July 19, 1996), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File
[hereinafter JCT Report].
6. See H.R. 3039. For an examination of this proposal see Bartlett, supra note
5.
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definition, apply only to consumption, any savings would be exempt
from tax until consumed.
From an international perspective, the NST (as envisaged in H.R.
3039) is destination-based, i.e., it applies to imports but not to exports,
like the value added taxes (VATs) of our major trading partners.
Specifically, the NST applies to the use, consumption, or enjoyment in
the United States of any taxable property or service, whether produced
or rendered within or without the United States, but it does not apply to
any property or service exported from the United States for use,
consumption, or enjoyment outside the United States. 7 Clearly, there
would be no taxation of inbound investment into the U.S. under the
NST, either in the form of an income tax or withholding taxes.

2.

The Flat Tax

The fiat tax proposal is more complicated than the NST, and some of
its details have not been fully worked out. Nevertheless, it is possible
to extrapolate the main international aspects of the proposal from the
bills filed by Representative Armey and Senator Shelby, and from the
description of the fiat tax by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka, who
originated the idea. 8
Instead of the current income tax system, Armey and Shelby propose
to substitute two fiat rate consumption-based taxes: an individual tax and
a business tax. The individual tax, at a rate between 17% and 20%,
would apply only to earned income (generally, compensation for
personal services, such as wages earned by an employee) less a relatively
high standard deduction ($21,400 per joint return, plus $5,000 for each
dependent). 9 Dividends, interest, capital gains, and other forms of
investment income would not be taxed. 10
The business tax, at a rate identical to the individual tax rate, would
apply to all businesses (including sole proprietorships and partnerships
as well as corporations) on a cash flow basis, i.e., businesses would be
allowed to deduct all expenses for business inputs (goods and services)

7. Ordinarily, the tax would be collected from the seller, but in the case of a
taxable good or service purchased outside the U.S. for use, consumption, or enjoyment
in the U.S., it would be collected from the purchaser. Special rules are provided for
financial intermediation and transportation services. See H.R. 3039; JCT Report, supra
note 5, at 214.
.
8. See H.R. 2060, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 1050, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995); ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (1995).
9. H.R. 2060 § 101 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 63); S. 1050 § 101
(proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 63).
10. H.R. 2060 § 101; S. 1050 § 101.
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and tangible personal and real property on a current basis. 11 In
addition, businesses would be allowed a deduction for compensation. 12
Financial income, such as dividends and interest, would be excluded and
no deduction would be allowed for interest. 13
The flat tax would be territorial at both the business and personal
levels. 14 The business tax would apply to revenue from sales in the
United States plus the value of exported products; deductions would be
allowed for business inputs in the United States as well as the value of
imported inputs. 15 If a U.S. firm sends parts to a plant in Mexico and
imports the finished product, the value of the exported parts would be
included in income and the value of the imported product allowed as a
deduction. 16 Similarly, the wage tax would only apply to earnings from
work performed in the United States, whether by U.S. citizens and
residents or by non-residents, but would exempt earnings from work
performed abroad (as well as, of course, all unearned income, whether
foreign or domestic). 17
While the business tax resembles a subtraction method Value Added
Tax (VAT), it differs from it in one crucial component, namely the
deductibility of wages. (It may, indeed, be thought of as a subtraction
method VAT, with employees being registered VAT taxpayers so that
payments to employees are subject to VAT and deductible by the
payor.)1 8 Because of this difference the flat tax cannot be made border
adjustable under the GATT, i.e., it cannot be imposed on imports and
rebated on exports. However, most other countries that use a VAT do
not allow a deduction for wages and make the VAT border adjustable
(as permitted under GATT). The flat tax proposal is an origin-based tax;

11. H.R. 2060 § 102 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 11); S. 1050 § 102
(proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 11).
12. H.R. 2060 § 102 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § l l(d)(l)(B)); S. 1050 § 102
(proposed amendment to I.R.C. § l l(d)(l)(B)).
13. H.R. 2060 § 102 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 1l(c), (d)); S. 1050 § 102
(proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 1l(c), (d)).
14. H.R. 2060 §§ 101, 102 (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 63(a)(l)(A),
ll(c)(2)(A)); S. 1050 §§ 101, 102 (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 63(a)(l)(A), 11
(c)(2)(A)).
15. Proposed amendment to I.R.C. § ll(d)(l)(A) does not appear to limit
deductions in this manner. H.R. 2060 § 102; S. 1050 § 102.
16. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 8, at 76.
17. H.R.2060 § 101 (proposedamendmenttoI.R.C. § 63(a)(l)(A)); S.1050 § 101
(proposed amendment to I.R.C. §63(a)(l)(A)).
18. I owe this observation to Oliver Oldman.
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most of our trading partners have a destination-based VAT. However,
this feature of the flat tax by itself should not be a problem, as trade
economists agree that exempting exports from taxation and imposing
taxes on imports has no major effect on the balance of trade, even if the
trading partner adopts an origin-based tax system. 19
From an international perspective, the crucial point regarding the flat
tax is that the U.S. income tax base is abandoned as thoroughly as in the
NST proposal. There is no withholding tax on inbound portfolio
investment, and no tax is imposed on investment income from sources
outside the United States. For business entities the expensing of capital
investments means that the effective rate of tax on marginal returns· is
zero, even though infra-marginal returns may be subject to tax because
of the origin principle (this point is elaborated further below).

3.

The USA Proposal: A Progressive Consumption Tax

The USA proposal is by far the most thoroughly elaborated and
carefully thought out of the three proposals currently on the table. Not
only has an extensive description and explanation of the "Unlimited
Savings Allowance Income Tax System" been published (hereinafter
referred to as the "USA Tax Description" or, simply, the "Description"),
but an elaborate bill with specific legislation to replace most of the
Internal Revenue Code has been introduced as Senate Bill 722. 20 The
following discussion is based on these two sources, and where they
diverge, the differences will be identified. As will be seen, the USA
proposal does avoid some of the specific pitfalls that face the two
proposals discussed above.
The essence of the USA proposal is as follows. Business is subject
to a flat 11 % tax rate, which applies to all forms of business (whether
or not incorporated), with an immediate deduction for capital investments.21 Financial receipts and payments (such as interest and dividends) are excluded from income and are not deductible, nor (unlike the
flat tax proposal) is compensation deductible. 22 The business tax is
territorial; businesses are not subject to tax on receipts from sales made
or services provided outside the United States.23 It is also border
adjustable; receipts from export sales are excluded, while imports are

19. See George R. Zodrow & Charles E. McLure Jr., Implementing Direct
Consumption Taxes in Developing Countries, 46 TAX L. REV. 405, 479 (1991).
20. O'Neill & Lutz, Description, supra note 4; S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
21. S. 722 § 301 (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 201(b), 204(a), 205(a)).
22. Id. (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 202, 203).
23. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 203(a)).
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subject to an import tax at the same rate as the business tax (or, in the
case of imported services, are not deductible). 24
Individuals are subject to tax at graduated rates (from 8% to 40%,
according to the legislative proposal) on their worldwide income, just
like under the current income tax. 25 However, individuals can deduct
all net savings (including bank accounts and other forms of savings) at
the end of the year and must include in income all dissaving (reduction
in net savings accumulated in previous years). 26 Individuals who also
own a business must file two separate returns, one for themselves and
one for the business.
The business tax is equivalent, in all material respects, to a subtraction
method VAT: All inputs other than compensation are deductible (if made
to business tax payers, i.e., registered VAT taxpayers) or subject to tax
(if made to persons not subject to the tax, such as foreigners in the case
of imports). 27 All receipts from sales of goods or services (but not
financial receipts) are includible. 28 These characteristics mean that the
tax is most likely border adjustable under the GATT, i.e., it is a
destination-based VAT, like those imposed by our trading partners. 29
As in the flat tax, the effective rate of tax on new business investment
in the U.S. will be zero because of the expensing of capital investments.
For U.S. citizens and residents the tax is imposed on world-wide
income. 30 World-wide savings are likewise deductible. 31 The proposal preserves the foreign earned income exclusion currently embodied in
I.R.C. § 911 (currently, up to $70,000). 32 According to the USA Tax

24. Id. (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 265, 266, 267, 286).
25. Id. § 201 (proposed amendments to I.R.C. §§ 1, 15).
26. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 50).
27. Id. § 301 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 205).
28. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 203).
29. It is likely, but not certain, that the exclusion of export receipts in the USA tax
would survive a GAIT challenge because of the similarity to a destination-based VAT,
although the attempt to label the USA tax as a business tax and not a VAT is unlikely
to be helpful. See Eric Toder, Comments on Proposals for Fundamental Tax Reform,
66 TAX NOTES 2003 (1995).
30. S. 722 § 201 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 3(a)).
31. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 53). As Shay points out, this provision
means that the actual effect on the USA tax proposal on domestic savings depends on
the attractiveness of foreign savings options, and on the ability to attract foreign portfolio
investment. Shay, supra note 3, at 2.2.3; Zodrow & McLure, supra note 19, at 451-52.
32. S. 722 § 201 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 4(a)(8)). The value of the
exclusion is increased, however, because of the steep rate schedule of the proposal
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Description, the foreign tax credit is abolished (but a deduction is
allowed for foreign taxes imposed on wages earned abroad), but under
the legislative proposal (which was filed later) the foreign tax credit is
preserved. 33
The legislative version of the USA proposal also takes a different view
on the taxation of non-resident aliens deriving income from sources
within the United States. The USA Tax Description does not address
the latter, except by implication, because it envisages repeal of the
source rules contained in I.R.C. §§ 861-865. 34 Since taxing nonresidents on passive ("fixed, determinable, annual or periodic") income
from the U.S. depends on the source rules, the Description seems to
envisage abolishing these withholding taxes. This is consistent with the
de facto repeal of the effective taxation of dividends, interest, and other
forms of the return on savings, granted it is consistent only by virtue of
the deductibility of net savings in the first place.
Senate Bill 722, however, retains the withholding system of current
law. A 30% tax is levied on amounts received by· nonresident alien
individuals "from sources within the United States" as FDAP. 35 This,
of course, means that the source rules have to be retained. The portfolio
interest exemption is likewise retained. There is even an attempt to tax
non-resident aliens who receive dividends, interest, or wages from
business operations conducted in the U.S., although the U.S. has never
succeeded in collecting such "second order" tax on distributions from
foreign corporations to their shareholders, creditors, or employees. 36
(The legislation does not retain the branch profit tax, which is an
effective, but complicated, solution to this problem). There is also an
attempt to retain the tax on expatriates in current section 877, although
the Treasury has admitted that this tax is almost never enforceable. 37
Moreover, as Steve Shay points out, the effect of the withholding
provisions of Senate Bill 722 will probably be nil, and the above
problems will disappear unless the legislative language is changed. That
result obtains because the withholding rules as drafted only apply to

(income above $24,000 on a joint return is taxed at the top 40% rate). Shay, supra note
3, at 2.2.4.
33. O'Neill & Lutz, Description, supra note 4, at 1524; S. 722 § 201 (proposed
amendment to 1.R.C. § 20(a)(l)).
34. O'Neill & Lutz, Description, supra note 4, at 1540.
35. S. 722 § 201 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 131).
36. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 131 (b)(4 )).
37. Id. (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 131(c)); see Samuel's Testimony at
Finance Hearing on Expatriate Taxation, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 56-40 (March 22,
1995), available in LEXIS, Taxana Library, TNT File. Section 877 has been modified
in 1996 in an attempt to address these problems; whether the modest modifications will
achieve this goal remains to be seen.
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individuals and not to offshore investment companies. 38 Dividends and
interest paid to such entities would also not be subject to the business
tax because a financial intermediation business conducted entirely
outside the U.S. is not subject to the tax. 39 If these provisions are
unchanged the U.S. has effectively "given away the store," and inbound
portfolio investment will be completely untaxed, because any individual
could set up an offshore investment vehicle to qualify for the exemption.

B.

Destination vs. Origin-Based Taxes

From an international perspective, the principal difference between the
flat tax, on the one hand, and the USA tax and the NST, on the other
hand, is that the former is origin-based (i.e., completely territorial--only
U.S. source income is taxed), whereas the latter are destination-based
(imports are taxed and exports are exempt, as in current VATs). As has
been pointed out repeatedly, it is a fallacy to assume that a destination
tax encourages exports more than an origin-based tax. That is because,
as pointed out most recently by Grubert and Newlon, 40 if capital is
immobile and trade must balance at any given moment of time, a tax on
imports would be the same as a tax on exports because imports must be
exchanged for exports. When capital is mobile, foreign assets can be
acquired for exports, and the net exports will be included in the origin
principle base but not in the destination principle base. However, on the
margin, every extra dollar of foreign investment will finance future
imports (purchased with the income from the investment) with a present
value of one dollar, because trade must balance in the long run. That is,
the return to the foreign investment is paid out in future imports
(included in the destination tax base) that is equal in present value terms
to the exports that financed the foreign investment (included in the
origin tax base). Thus, at the margin, the origin and destination bases
are equal because taxing the current marginal export is equal in present
value terms to taxing the stream of future imports generated by that
export. 41

38.

S. 722 § 201 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 131); Shay, supra note 3, at

2.3.3.

39. S. 722 § 301 (proposed amendment to I.R.C. § 242(c)(2)).
40. Grubert & Newlon, supra note 3, at 628.
41. Id. at 628; see also JCT Report, supra note 5, at 290-92, 296-97. But see
Hines, supra note 3, who notes some of the limitations of this analysis in the short run.
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However, a destination-based tax is superior to an origin-based tax
because of the administrative complexity involved in an origin-based tax.
Specifically, an origin-based business tax does nothing to resolve the
transfer pricing problem, which has been vexing the IRS for many years
and is likely to continue as a major source of difficulty in years to come,
despite the adoption of new regulations to deal with the problem.42
This can be illustrated by an example given by Hall and Rabushka of
a U.S. firm that sends parts to Mexico and re-imports the finished
product. The value of the exported parts would be included in income,
and the value of the imported product allowed as a deduction. 43 If the
Mexican entity is controlled by the U.S. exporter/re-importer, there
would be a strong incentive to value the goods as low as possible on
their way out and to buy them for as much as possible on their way back
in as finished products, with the profit remaining in Mexico (where it
may or may not be taxed, depending on the vicissitudes of the
Maquiladora regime). There is no I.R.C. § 482 in House Bill 2060 to
combat this problem. Thus, it is not enough to say, as Hall and
Rabushka do, that it would be easy to value imports based on "the actual
amount paid for them in the country of their origin";44 if that amount
is paid to a related entity, it may bear little relation to actual value, but
it would be quite hard to prove this, as the IRS has found out under the
present Code. While this problem exists under present law, it would be
exacerbated under a territorial system that never taxes foreign profits.
In addition, McLure and Zodrow have pointed out that because interest
expense is not deductible and interest income is excluded under the flat
tax, there will be a significant incentive to shift interest expense to other
forms of deductible expenses and to shift other forms of income to
interest income when the other party to the transaction is indifferent
because they are subject to a traditional income tax. 45 This incentive
could significantly reduce receipts from the business portion of the flat
tax. For example, assume a U.S. firm (USCo) that sells its products to
a foreign firm (ForCo) and simultaneously either lends money to ForCo
or borrows money from ForCo. In the first case (i.e., a loan to ForCo ),
USCo has an incentive to reduce the price of its products (thus reducing
taxable receipts) while raising the interest rate on the loan (thus earning

42. Hines, supra note 3, agrees with this point but argues that transfer pricing
abuse is unlikely given the low U.S. tax rate under the flat tax. Nevertheless, transfer
pricing abuse is an issue under any positive rate if the alternative is to locate profits in
a tax haven or a country with a tax holiday. Moreover, rates are subject to change.
43. HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 8, at 76.
44. Id.
45. McLure & Zodrow, supra note 3, at 80.
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exempt income); ForCo is indifferent since both expenses are deductible.
In the second case (a loan from ForCo), ForCo would be willing to
obtain a lower interest rate on its loan to USCo, compensated by the
lower sales price of the products; USCo benefits from lower taxable
receipts, while the interest expense is not deductible. The same analysis
applies, with the roles reversed, when USCo buys products from ForCo;
in this case, USCo will seek to increase the deductible inputs while
decreasing the non-deductible interest expense or increasing the
excludible interest income.
Some of the problems in the flat tax can perhaps be fixed with
appropriate technical modifications. For example, the interest income
and expense issue can be solved by including in income all borrowings
(principal and interest) and allowing a deduction for all repayments
(principal and interest), i.e., moving to a cash flow tax, which in present
value terms is equivalent to the current proposal of excluding interest
income and disallowing interest deductions. 46 However, that would
reinstate one of the most vexing problems in current law, namely how
to distinguish between interest expense (deductible) and dividends (nondeductible in both systems). Similarly, the transfer pricing issue can
perhaps be solved by extensive auditing and coordination with customs
valuations where the incentive is to reduce value, although the experience with these methods under the income tax has been far from
prom1smg. However, these changes would mean that the resulting
system would, in practice,· be far from the simple, tax-retum-on-apostcard ideal envisaged by the sponsors of the flat tax.
A destination-based VAT like the USA business tax (and the NST)
eliminates both of these problems. As the sponsors of the USA proposal
claim, it would not be advantageous to inflate the price of deductible
inputs from related parties because that would result in a higher import
tax being levied on the same inputs. 47 However, as discussed below,
transfer pricing will still be significant from the perspective of our
trading partners, and this could lead to unfavorable repercussions for
U.S. businesses.
In addition, this feature of the USA business tax solves McLure and
Zodrow's interest problem: 48 In the case of a U.S. importer, there

46.
47.
48.

Id. at 17.
O'Neill & Lutz, Description, supra note 4, at 1496-97.
McLure & Zudrow, supra note 3.
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would be no advantage to increasing the price of (deductible) imported
goods in exchange for a lower interest rate on borrowed funds or a
higher rate on funds lent to the seller because the imports would be
subject to import tax; exports are not a problem since the system ignores
both receipts from exports and interest income and expense. The USA
tax is therefore significantly superior to the origin-based flat tax on
administrative grounds.
There are several additional reasons for preferring a destination-based
tax. In an origin-based tax there is some incentive for multinational
corporations ("MNCs") to locate production in low tax countries in an
attempt to avoid U.S. tax on super-normal, infra-marginal returns. This
tax arises because, as Grubert and Newlon pointed out, the destination
and origin principles are only equivalent if the investment abroad earns
normal returns. Assume that a U.S. person sells $1 of goods abroad and
invests the dollar in foreign assets. The export sale would be taxed
under the origin principle but exempt under the destination principle. If
the investment abroad results in future imports with a present value of
$1, the destination and origin principles would result in the same tax in
the long run. If, on the other hand, the investment results in future
imports with a present value of $2 (i.e., if it earns above normal returns),
these returns would be taxed under the destination principle (which taxes
all imports), but not under the origin principle. However, if the
investment were domestic, the full return (including any super-normal
returns) would be taxed under both the origin and destination principles.49
In addition, the transition effects of an origin-based tax would confer
a windfall on U.S. persons holding foreign .assets. That is because (in
the absence of special transition rules), if a U.S. person holds foreign
assets acquired prior to the adoption of an origin-based tax, the return on
those earnings in the form of future imports would escape tax, even
though the exports used to acquire these assets were not taxed (because
they occurred before the enactment of the origin-based tax). On the
other hand, under a destination-based tax, the future imports would be
taxed. 50
There are some problems associated with a destination-based tax
(which are grounds for preferring an origin-based tax), but they seem
less compelling than its advantages. Under a destination-based tax, it is
necessary to identify non-deductible foreign services and to distinguish
them from deductible domestic services, giving rise to a transfer pricing

49.
50.
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issue. Moreover, it will be necessary under a destination-based tax to
. allocate the service fees of financial intermediaries between foreign and
domestic sources. These problems do not exist in an origin-based tax.
However, they seem no more difficult than the many sourcing issues
which arise under the current income tax, or under the destination-based
VAT, as adopted throughout the world, and they are narrower than the
problems identified above with origin-based taxes. 51
A destination-based consumption tax also creates incentives to shop
abroad and to emigrate because foreign consumption is exempt from tax.
However, these incentives can perhaps be countered through adequate
customs enforcement and through imposing a tax upon emigration.
Moreover, as Hines pointed out, Americans have traditionally showed
little inclination to emigrate en masse in response to tax incentives. 52
IL

THE IMPACT OF TAX REFORM ON INBOUND AND OUTBOUND
INVESTMENT

A.

The Likely Reaction of Taxpayers

To asses's the likely reaction of taxpayers to the three consumption tax
proposals, it is necessary first to briefly summarize some of the main
features of the current international tax regime. 53 There are two major
types of tax jurisdiction: jurisdiction based on the residence of the
taxpayer and jurisdiction based on the source of the income. The first
type typically applies to foreign source income of all residents of the
taxing jurisdiction, whereas the second applies to income derived from
the taxing jurisdiction by non-residents. In general, the trend in
international taxation has been to tax portfolio income and wages, most
of which is earned by individual taxpayers, on a residence basis, while
active business income, much of which is earned by corporations, is
taxed primarily on a source basis. In both cases, however, there is
residual taxation on a source basis of portfolio income (as indicated by
the retention of low withholding taxes in tax treaties), and residual
residence-based taxation of business income (as indicated by Subpart F

51.
52.
53.

Id. at 630.
Hines, supra note 3.
This summary is based on Avi-Yonah, supra note 1.
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and similar provisions aimed at taxing business income derived from tax
havens on a residence basis).
The three consumption tax proposals, if enacted, would tend to
undermine both of these types of jurisdiction to tax, from the perspective
of an income tax. Let us consider :first the implications for inbound
portfolio investment. The ability of foreign countries to implement
effective residence-based taxation of their residents has always been
limited by the existence of tax havens, but tax havens do not offer the
same investment opportunities as a major industrialized economy, and
some progress has been made in curbing the use of tax havens through
limitations on treaty benefits and information exchange programs.
Were the U.S. to abolish income taxation and implement one of the
three consumption tax proposals, there would likely be no effective
withholding tax on new inbound portfolio investment. In the case of the
NST and the flat tax, withholding taxes are abolished. As for the USA
tax, the proposal abandons the withholding tax, but the legislative
version retains it in order to induce other countries to enter into treaties
with the United States. Indeed, the withholding taxes are abolished for
residents of any foreign country that does not levy similar taxes on U.S.
residents, and has a tax information sharing agreement with the United
States. 54 We shall discuss the question of treaties further below, but
there is a problem with the withholding tax as proposed (even disregarding the technical point identified by Steve Shay, which can perhaps be
:fixed by changing the statutory language): Since foreigners get no
deduction for their U.S. savings (they have no net U.S. tax liability and
savings are not deductible against the gross withholding tax), U.S.
residents would end up having a much lower tax burden on investments
in the U.S. than foreigners (except to the extent the portfolio interest
exemption applies). 55 This situation, in addition to being discriminatory
and arguably violating the very treaties it is designed to salvage, also
could drive a wedge against foreign investment in the U.S.: Why should
a U.S. corporation be willing to reimburse a foreign investor against
withholding taxes imposed on dividends or interest when there is no
need to similarly reimburse a U.S. investor who pays no effective

54. S. 722, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201 (1995) (proposed amendment to I.R.C.
§ 133(c)).
55. It could be argued that the portfolio interest exemption and other current
loopholes in the withholding regime mean that abandoning withholding taxes will not
attract much new investment into the United States. Nevertheless, the U.S. does collect
some $2 billion in withholding taxes each year, and in the case of dividends, the change
would be significant.
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tax? 56 Moreover, it seems strange for a tax that is intended to apply to
consumption, but not savings, to operate precisely the opposite way
when it comes to non-residents: While a French citizen visiting the
United States may consume as much as she desires without being subject
to the USA tax, the same person would be subject to tax when she
invests her savings in the shares of a United States corporation. It
would seem more consistent with the purposes of the USA proposal to
refrain from taxing such investments from abroad. Thus, it seems
unlikely that the withholding tax would survive under the USA proposal
and its abolition seems more consistent with the goals of that proposal
as set out in the Description. 57
Ever since the U.S. unilaterally abolished withholding on portfolio
interest investments by foreigners in 1984, a significant portion the
world's capital flight has found itself channeled to the U.S. 58 The
result has been an acute lack of capital in many developing countries,
whose elites found it much safer to invest tax-free in the U.S. than to
invest in taxable (or even tax-free, but riskier) projects back home. This
phenomenon will likely be amplified many times over if the income tax
is entirely abolished. Since the U.S. will not tax funds spent on
consumption outside its boundaries, while consumption goes effectively
untaxed in many other jurisdictions, much of the world's mobile capital
may be invested tax-free in the U.S., but consumed outside its borders.59 The likely outcome for both outbound and inbound direct
investment would be similar: A net increase in investment in the U.S.

56. Admittedly, similar situations exist currently; for example, foreigners typically
pay a higher rate of tax for investments in countries that grant shareholders integration
credits for corporate taxes, because such credits are typically granted only to domestic
shareholders. But the gap is usually smaller than the 30%+ wedge (between a zero
effective rate and a 30% rate on the gross payment) that would exist under the USA tax.
57. S. 722 § IOl(a).
58. Foreign portfolio investment in the U.S. has risen from $25.7 billion in 1980
to $202.5 billion in 1994, compared to a rise in foreign direct investment from $16.9
(1980) to only $49.4 (1994). By comparison, U.S. portfolio investment abroad has also
risen, but at a much slower rate (from $54.4 billion in 1980 to $81.5 billion in 1994),
while U.S. direct investment abroad is comparable to foreign direct investment into the
U.S. ($19.2 billion in 1980, $49.4 billion in 1994). JCT Report, supra note 5, Table 1.
59. Grubert and Newlon agree with this conclusion, but note that the effect may
be dampened if the move to a consumption tax reduces U.S. interest rates. Grubert &
Newlon, supra note 3, at 632-35. See also JCT Report, supra note 5, at 318-22.
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and a net decrease in investment in other countries. 60 That is because
under all three proposals the effective rate of tax for the normal returns
on new investment in the U.S. would be zero. For U.S. corporations,
who currently benefit from deferral of the foreign source active income
of their subsidiaries (and therefore seek to increase such foreign source
earnings), the main goal would become to shift as much of their worldwide profit as possible to the U.S. This can be achieved, e.g., by
transfer pricing manipulation (i.e., by inflating the cost of goods sold by
U.S. entities to related parties abroad), and by repatriating as much
earnings as possible from foreign subsidiaries as deductible interest or
royalty payments. The end result would likely be a distortion of capital
flows, with increasing investment by U.S.-based multinationals in the
U.S., even if (but for taxes) other areas of the world are more promising.
As far as inbound foreign direct investment is concerned, the likely
outcome from abolishing the income tax will be a repetition of the
scenario for outbound direct investment, but in the reverse: Foreignbased multinationals will seek to expand their investments in the U.S.,
possibly by buying U.S. corporations and shifting taxable profits to them
in the same ways outlined above.
To sum up, the likely effects of abolishing the income tax and
replacing it with a consumption tax would be to attract significantly
more investment into the U.S. Foreign portfolio investment may flow
in, at significant costs to the ability of other countries to effectively tax
their residents. Both U.S. and foreign corporations would likely attempt
to shift taxable profits to the U.S. These conclusions, however, may be
affected by the likely reaction of other countries.

B.

The Likely Reaction of Our Trading Partners

When discussing the likely reaction of other countries, it is necessary
to distinguish between our major trading partners, which have developed
economies that can expect investment by MNCs even when their tax
rates are higher than the U.S. rate, and the rest of the world, which
cannot expect to compete for investment in the absence of a favorable
tax regime. For developing and transition economies, a shift by the
United States to a consumption tax (and in particular, the abolition of
withholding taxes on portfolio investment and of the corporate income
tax) may effectively force them to abandon residence-based income

60. As Grubert and Newlon conclude, "MNCs would likely shift tangible
investment, intangible assets, and R&D to the United States." Grubert & Newlon, supra
note 3, at 620. But as discussed below, this conclusion may not take sufficiently into
account the reaction of other countries.
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taxation altogether, which may or may not be consistent with their longterm interests and policy preferences. 61
As for developed countries, the question is how they are likely to react
to the increase in U.S.-bound investment by both American and foreign
MNCs. There are two possible reactions. In the first, the reduction of
taxes by the U.S. will force other countries to reduce their taxes on
capital as well, and perhaps adopt similar reforms, as envisaged by
McLure. Grubert and Newlon seem to consider this the most likely
outcome, and state that the overall effect on global efficiency is unclear:
While the distortionary tendency to shift capital to the U.S. would be
muted, other countries may have to raise other taxes to make up for the
lost revenue, which could lead to other types of distortion. The choice
facing those other countries may be more politically difficult than
envisaged by Grubert and Newlon: Countries which have a VAT
already tax consumption at much higher rates than the U.S., and
individual income tax rates also tend to be higher. Thus, countries with
little leverage may have no choice but to reduce taxes on capital without
replacing the foregone revenue, with significant policy effects. 62
However, there is another possible reaction, especially for developed
countries like our major trading partners. Those countries could try to
capture the tax revenue unilaterally foregone by the U.S. "Taxation
abhors a vacuum": In the past, whenever situations arose that enabled
MNCs to channel their profits to low-tax jurisdictions, the members of
the OECD took steps (like the adoption of Subpart F by the U.S. and
thereafter by other OECD members) to capture the tax on those profits.
In the case of foreign MNCs, the reaction of foreign countries would be
relatively simple: To extend the world-wide taxation of their resident
MNCs to capture the U.S. source profits. In that situation, the U.S. will
ironically have to make the same argument that it has consistently
ignored in refusing to grant tax sparing credits in its treaties: That other
countries are essentially transferring revenue from its fisc to their own,
thus nullifying the effect of the tax holiday granted by the U.S. Other
countries may then reply, as the U.S. has consistently since the 1960s,

61. For a view advocating this result as advantageous to developing countries (on
a consensual, not forced, basis) see Zodrow & McLure, supra note 19.
62. But see Grubert & Newlon, Reply, supra note 3, at 269 (arguing that other
countries do have scope to raise consumption taxes). I believe such a choice would be
very difficult politically, whatever the data on taxes as a percentage of GDP.
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that the U.S. should not have made the tax holiday possible in the first
place.
The reason foreign countries with major MNCs (i.e., the other OECD
members) are likely to adopt this attitude is that they are unlikely to be
harmed by it, in the sense of losing investments by their MNCs to the
U.S. From the point of view of a foreign MNC, the adoption of
consumption taxation and the abolition of the U.S. corporate income tax
(except on super-normal returns, under an origin-based tax) represent a
pure windfall, which would lead it to expand investment in the U.S.
The imposition of home country tax on that income would restore the
situation to the status quo before the windfall and investment patterns
would return to their normal state. Grubert and Newlon consider this
option unlikely and believe investment in the U.S. would increase even
if (as is .likely) no credit is given abroad for the consumption-based
taxes, because of deferral and cross-crediting.63 However, deferral is
unlikely to be granted to the U.S. given th.at the effective U.S. tax rate
will be zero, and even countries that currently exempt active foreign
income may rethink this position in the face of such a tax haven; while
cross-crediting can be eliminated by the simple expedient of a percountry limitation for the U.S. (since all U.S. income from capital will
be taxed at the zero rate, no internal averaging is possible).
As for U.S.-based MNCs, other developed countries, which can count
on some level of continued U.S. direct investment, may be able to
capture some of the revenue foregone by the U.S. on those entities as
well. Grubert and Newlon point out the likely imposition of transfer
pricing rules and thin capitalization requirements by foreign governments
as a reaction to the adoption of consumption tax reform by the U.S.; 64
in addition, changes in the source rules are possible to make more
income of U.S. MNCs sourced in the foreign countries where they
conduct business. Once again, the U.S. MNCs may refrain from
penalizing foreign countries by pulling out altogether as long as the
overall effect of those changes is simply to reverse the windfall resulting
from the abolition of the U.S. corporate income tax. The end result is
less distortion in the allocation of global capital investment than in the
absence of such reactions by foreign governments, but also a direct
transfer of funds from the U.S. fisc to those of our trading partners.
In conclusion, the likely reaction of other governments to tax reform
in the United States depends on their relative strength in attracting
inbound investment. Countries with small or underdeveloped markets

63.
64.
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may be forced to follow the U.S. in abandoning income taxation and
either replace it with higher taxes on consumption or abandon some of
the policy goals for which they need the tax revenues from the income
tax. Other countries, with more leverage, may react by entering into
another form of tax competition, in which they try to capture the tax
base foregone by the U.S.
III.

THE IMPACT OF TAX REFORM ON THE
U.S. TAX TREATY NETWORK

The income tax treaty network is one of the most significant
achievements of 20th century international law. Through more than
1,200 bilateral treaties conforming in general to the OECD or UN
models, most countries have agreed to follow a broad consensus about
the proper allocation of taxable income among taxing jurisdictions. This
consensus has been described above. In treaty terms, it can be
summarized as follows: Active business income is taxable by the
jurisdiction in which it is earned (the source jurisdiction) if the activities
of the taxpayer in that jurisdiction are significant enough to rise to the
level of a "permanent establishment." Passive income, on the other
hand, is taxable primarily in the jurisdiction in which the taxpayer
resides (the residence jurisdiction), with only a relatively low withholding tax being payable to the source country. 65
While this consensus has several unsolved problems (as described
above), overall it has proven to be extremely resilient and has been
maintained through fifty years of immense economic and technological
changes. However, if a major player in the world economy unilaterally
abandons income taxation, the survival of the consensus is .far from
assured, and the likely replacement if the consensus collapses is far from
clear.
The simplest case to consider in this regard is again the NST proposal
to completely abolish the income tax and replace it with a sales tax.
Obviously, this reform would render all existing U.S. income tax treaties
obsolete. There would be a highly significant enticement for both
portfolio capital and direct investment to flow into the U.S., and there
would be no reason other than competition for capital for countries not

65.

See generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 1.
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to tax inbound U.S. investment. Thus, there would be little incentive to
keep the treaty regime in place.
The situation would not be much different under the other two regimes
considered above. First, as a purely legal matter, neither the flat tax nor
the USA tax likely qualify as "income taxes" under the U.S. definition
of the term, because they both deny a deduction for interest expense.
(Nor would the situation change if loans were included in income and
principal and interest were deductible, because the inclusion of loans
would violate the realization requirement that defines an income tax
under U.S. rules). 66 Thus, in both cases, the United States has no right
to expect that other countries would maintain their income tax treaties
with it after tax reform is enacted, unless it is in their interest to do so,
because the tax that the U.S. would levy is not an income tax.
Fundamentally, income tax conventions apply to taxes on "income and
capital," therefore, taxes on consumption are not covered. 67
.
Under the flat tax regime, the U.S. tax system is completely territorial,
has very low effective? corporate and individual tax rates, and does not
tax passive income (i.e.; there is no withholding). As far as direct
investment is concerned, the effect is similar to abolishing the corporate
income tax, because there is no effective tax on the normal returns to
new investment. Thus, large foreign countries would have the same
incentive to capture the residual income foregone by the U.S. For
portfolio investment, the result under the flat tax is identical to the
abolition of the income tax, because there is no taxation of passive
income flowing out of the United States. Thus, in practice, foreign
countries that have the ability to attract American business would have
no incentive to renegotiate tax treaties with the U.S. to cover the flat tax
(especially since there is no taxation of U.S. investment abroad); instead,
as outlined under the sales tax scenario, they would expand their tax
base of direct investment, while a race to the bottom would develop for
portfolio investment.

66. See I.R.C. § 901 (West Supp. 1996); Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4) (1983). The
author has been involved in trying to persuade the U.S. Treasury that a Bolivian tax that
was similar to the USA business tax, except that it included loans in income and
permitted deductions of principal and interest, was a creditable tax, to no avail.
67. For a more optimistic view, see JCT Report, supra note 5, at 334-47, which
takes the view that the reaction by treaty partners depends in large part on the form of
the tax reform in the United States. On the other hand, Grubert & Newlon, Reply, supra
note 3, at 270, views U.S. tax reform as no different from other countries that have in
the past lowered their taxes on capital (e.g., through accelerated depreciation). I believe
moving to a consumption tax in the U.S., with all the attendant rhetoric about abolishing
the income tax, is fundamentally different, if only because it will be politically very
difficult to re-adopt an income tax.
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Finally, the USA proposal, especially in its legislative form, makes an
effort to save the income tax treaty system, but that effort seems unlikely
to succeed. First, in regard to direct investment, the effect of the USA
proposal is the abolition of the corporate income tax and its replacement
by a destination-based VAT. Thus, there would be no reason for our
treaty partners to maintain their treaties with the U.S. for corporate
income taxation, because the U.S. will not have a corporate tax base.
Second, for portfolio investment, the USA proposal maintains worldwide taxation of U.S. residents and (nominally) withholding taxes on
non-residents. However, residents are effectively exempt from U.S.
taxation of their domestic investments because of the deduction for net
savings and therefore would not invest abroad unless the effective tax
rate on their investment at source is zero. In this situation, foreign
governments are unlikely to want to maintain a treaty network with the
U.S., because they would have to reduce their withholding at source to
zero to attract U.S. investors even in the absence of a treaty, and if they
do so, the U.S. withholding tax would likewise disappear (or else the
U.S. could not attract foreign capital). The end result is, therefore, likely
to be similar to that described for the other two cases: An expansion of
foreign taxation of direct investment to capture the tax base abandoned
by the U.S. and the abolition of all taxation at source for portfolio
investment.
Grubert and Newlon argue counter-intuitively that even though the flat
tax and USA tax are not income taxes and thus would entitle foreign
governments to terminate the treaties with the U.S., they would not do
so because of their fear that, in the absence of a treaty, the U.S. would
impose its high statutory withholding rate on investments from the
foreign country into the U.S., while retaining the treaty would force the
U.S. (because of the non-discrimination provision) to impose no
withholding taxes on foreign investment, because no tax is imposed on
domestic investment. 68
This point seems inconsistent with the rest of Grubert and Newlon's
argument. The whole thrust of their article up to the point in which they
make this argument has been to show that foreign residents (especially
MNCs) would have significant incentives to move their investments into
the U.S. because of the effective zero tax rate. Foreign governments

68.

Grubert & Newlon, supra note 3.
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presumably would not welcome this development, and may indeed (as
Grubert and Newlon state) face considerable pressure to reduce their
own tax rate to counter it.69 Thus, it seems unlikely that foreign
governments would object to high U.S. withholding taxes on foreign
direct investment, which would at least reduce, if not eliminate, the
incentive to shift investment into the U.S. Foreign governments may
terminate their treaties precisely to achieve the imposition of withholding
taxes, as well as to have the right to discriminate against U.S. investment
in the case of a tax war; for the same reasons, the U.S. seems unlikely
to want to impose such taxes. In fact, none of the current proposals
envisage retaining the thirty percent withholding rate for corporations,
while individuals already benefit from no withholding on portfolio
interest investment. 70
Grubert and Newlon, as well as Hines, make one further argument for
the proposition that tax treaties will be retained: Foreign governments
might not wish their own statutory withholding rates to apply to U.S.
investors, since that would make their country even less competitive with
the U.S. 71 But surely, if they wish to do so, foreign governments can
abolish their own withholding taxes on U.S. investors, even in the
absence of a treaty, just as the U.S. did when it adopted the portfolio
interest exemption in 1984. 72 Thus, it seems unlikely that the U.S.
treaty regime would survive a move to a consumption tax base by the
United States.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The discussion above suggested that the adoption of any of the
consumption tax proposals by the U.S. would have significant international implications and may lead to the dismantling of the current

69. Id.
70. Stephen Shay also notes that the point made by Grubert and Newlon would
only apply to countries that export more capital to the U.S. than they import from it.
Many OECD members, and almost all non-OECD member countries, currently import
more capital from the U.S. than they export into it, especially when portfolio investment
(which is generally not subject to withholding taxes) is excluded; although this
relationship could shift if the U.S. adopts a consumption tax. Shay, supra note 3.
71. Grubert & Newlon, supra note 3; Hines, supra note 3.
72. Hines also points out that other countries may not wish to terminate their tax
treaties with the U.S. because of their general diplomatic relationship with the U.S.
government. While this may be true, it seems very risky to rely on the general
diplomatic relations to avoid termination of treaties when such termination is in the
economic interest of the treaty partner, and the treaty partner has the legal right to
terminate the treaty under the Vienna Convention. It may even be possible, as Shay
points out, to terminate the withholding tax reductions in a treaty while leaving the nondiscrimination article in place.
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international tax regime, as embodied in the treaty system. The
remaining question is: Would that development be positive or negative,
and if the latter, what can the U.S. do to mitigate any adverse effects?
The answer to this question is difficult, because it depends not only
on the likely reactions by taxpayers to the reform, but also to the
reactions of foreign governments, which are much more difficult to
predict with any accuracy. Fundamentally, one can envisage two
scenarios: positive and negative.
·
Under the positive scenario, fundamental tax reform in the U.S. is
followed by a shift to consumption taxes by most, if not all, other
countries in the world. Whether that would be a positive development
from the perspective of either equity or efficiency lies beyond the scope
of this Article. However, as McClure pointed out, such a development
has definite potential for drastically simplifying the international tax
regime, as evidenced by the current situation with respect to VAT. 73
In the case of VAT, because all countries follow the destination
principle, the allocation of the tax base among countries is much less
complicated than in an income tax, and there is no need for an elaborate
network of tax treaties to resolve disputes in that regard. Thus, if one
can envision a world with no income taxation, as does McLure, it
certainly has some appeal from an international tax perspective, if only
in reduced transaction costs.
On the other hand, the situation is less promising if a significant
number of countries wish to retain the income tax. In the case of
developing countries, as outlined above, this may be very difficult to
achieve if the U.S. abolishes the income tax because those countries do
not have the leverage to attract the investment that will flow into the
U.S. This will be especially true if the U.S. abandons its current
cooperation in information exchange programs, which are the only
means by which such countries can enforce residence-based taxation on
the U.S. income of their citizens.
In the case of developed countries, as discussed above, if they retain
their income tax, there will be a significant incentive to abandon their
tax treaties with the U.S. and enter into a "tax war," in which each
country attempts to capture the income tax base foregone by the U.S.
Such a development may not have a negative effect if all it does is
73. See Charles E. McLure Jr., Substituting Consumption-Based Direct Taxation
for Income Taxes as the International Norm, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 145 (1992).

1353

restore the status quo, by effectively inducing MNCs to shift investments
back to the pattern that existed before the U.S. abolished the corporate
income tax. On the other hand, in the absence of a tax treaty system,
one could envisage situations in which several countries try to tax the
same U.S. source profits simultaneously (e.g., by allocating the same
profits to domestic sources), which could lead to increased circumstances
of double taxation.
Assuming that tax reform is adopted, the key issue therefore is: What
should the U.S. be doing to prevent negative consequences from tax
reform? Three points may be suggested in this regard. First, in regard
to the taxation of portfolio investment, the U.S. should maintain and
seek to expand its exchange of information program, to enable other
countries to impose residence-based income taxation on U.S. source
income of their residents. The exchange of information article has
recently enabled the U.S. to enter into several tax treaties with developing countries, even with the portfolio interest exemption in place, and the
same trend could continue following tax reform. This, however, would
mean that the IRS and its information collecting capacity (which is the
most advanced in the world) should be retained, contrary to the desire
of some current tax reformers. 74
Second, in regard to direct investment, we may want to maintain some
ways for U.S.-based MNCs to use the U.S. government to prevent
double taxation of their profits, even in the absence of a tax treaty.
While the current competent authority mechanism depends on the tax
treaty, it may be possible to maintain those links, for example, under the
aegis of friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties, which do not
depend on both countries sharing the same tax base.
Third, the U.S. could use its leverage in other contexts to prevent
other countries from launching measures that discriminate against U.S.
residents, even in the absence of a tax treaty. In particular, the World
Trade Organization, in which there is the ability for discussing many
issues simultaneously, may offer a potential venue in this regard. 75
Indeed, it may be that, in an increasingly competitive world, the role of
the bilateral tax treaty is over and that a multilateral system that can
address tax together with other issues is needed to resolve the types of
potential conflict addressed in this Article.

74. See, e.g., H.R. 3039, 104th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996), which would forbid
appropriations to the IRS after the year 2000.
75. Note, however, that in the Uruguay Round the U.S. steadfastly refused to
submit tax matters to the jurisdiction of the WTO.
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